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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
X7

ANTHONY A. SADDLER,

Case No. 20020119-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), where the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an
appeal to the Court of Appealsfromafinalorder for anything other than afirstdegree or
capital felony offense. In the underlying case related to this appeal, Appellant Anthony
Saddler was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, a third degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii)
(1998). A copy of the judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether the trial court erred in
upholding the magistrate judge's determination that the detective's affidavit established
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for Saddler's home.
Standard of Review:
1

Because this court, like the reviewing court below, is bound by the
contents of the affidavit, we therefore need not defer to the trial
court's finding, but rather, we make an independent review of the
trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the written evidence.
State v. Weaver. 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah Ct. App.1991). However, "the [FJourth
[AJmendment does not require that the reviewing court conduct a de novo review
of the magistrate's probable cause determinationf.] [I]nstead, it requires only that
the reviewing court conclude 'that the magistrate had a substantial basis for...
[determining] that probable cause existed.'" State v. Babbell 770 P.2d 987, 991
(Utah 1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317,2332,
76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)) (fifth and sixth alterations in original).
Furthermore, "the reviewing court is required to give great deference to the
magistrate's determination." State v. White. 851 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Utah
Ct.App.1993). Great deference is given because '"[a] grudging or negative
attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants' is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant."
Gates. 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331 (citation omitted).
State v.Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,119-10,40 P.3d 1136.
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The issue was preserved in the record on appeal at 35-57 and 127.
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provision will be determinative of the issue on
appeal: U.S. Const, amend. IV. The text of that provision is contained in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings. Disposition in the Court Below.
On August 4,2000, the state filed an Information against Saddler for unlawful
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and unlawful possession of cocaine,
both third degree felony offenses under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) and (2)(a)(i)
2

(1998). (R. 1-3.) On August 15,2001, the defense filed a motion to suppress evidence
of the controlled substances on the basis that the evidence was obtained with an unlawful
search warrant. Specifically, the defense argued that the affidavit presented to the
magistrate judge in support of the warrant failed to support probable cause for the search.
(R. 35-57.) A copy of the affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum C, and a copy of the
search warrant issued in connection therewith is attached as Addendum D.
The state opposed the motion and on September 11,2001, a hearing was held in
the matter. (See R. 60-69; 127.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge denied
the motion to suppress. (R. 127:12-13.) A copy of the trial judge's ruling is attached
hereto as Addendum E.
On September 25,2001, Saddler entered into a conditional plea for possession of
marijuana, a third degree felony offense, and he specifically reserved the right to appeal
the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. (See.generally, R. 80-84; specifically,
81); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i) (2002). After entry of the plea, on January 29,2002,
the trial court sentenced Saddler to serve an indeterminate prison term of zero to five
years. The prison term was suspended and Saddler was placed on probation for 24
months. (R. 107-08.) This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 4,2000, the statefiledcharges against Saddler for drug possession.
The charges were based on a "probable cause" statement set forth in the Information:

3

The statement of West Valley Police Detective B. McCarthy that on June 15,
2000, at 3194 South 4300 West, in Salt Lake County, Utah, a search warrant was
executed at the residence of the defendant, Anthony Alexander Saddler. Detective
McCarthy states that defendant was present, and that a search of the residence
revealed 277 grams [a half pound] of field tested positive marijuana, weighing
scales, and a quantity of a substance thatfieldtested positive for cocaine.
(R. 3 (emphasis added).) During trial court proceedings, the defense challenged the affidavit presented in support of the search warrant referenced above. The defense argued
that the affidavit lacked probable cause to support issuance of the warrant. (R. 127.)
During a hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties looked to the four corners
of the affidavit. The affidavit stated in relevant part the following:
Your affiant, Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022, is employed by the West
Valley City Police Department, and is currently assigned to the Neighborhood
Narcotics Unit. Your affiant has been given the responsibility to investigate
narcotic offenses occurring in West Valley City and surrounding areas.
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and in the
investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has personally purchased
various narcotics on numerous occasions in relation to police investigations.
Affiant was previously assigned to the Metro narcotics Strike Force and the Drug
Enforcement Strike Force. Your affiant is a certified peace officer in the State of
Utah for over 19 years. Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA basic
and advanced investigators seminars, as well as the California Narcotics Officers
Association seminars in drug recognition, identification and investigative
techniques. Your affiant is also certified in the investigation of Clandestine
Methamphetamine Laboratories. Your affiant is a certified Bomb Technician.
Your affiant is investigating Anthony A. Saddler for usage and distribution
of a controlled substances, specifically marijuana and cocaine. Your affiant
received information from a confidential informant, hereinafter referred to as CI.
Your affiant ask[s] the courts not to require your affiant to publish the CFs name.
Your affiant believes that the CI may be harmed if CFs name were published.
Your affiant was told the following by the CI:
1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year,
2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on numerous
occasions during the last year,
4

3. CI has used marijuana with the suspect on several occasions,
4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent being
within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana,
5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the suspect uses to
weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale,
6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with packaging
material,
7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on his person,
8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells marijuana and cocaine,
9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled substances, inside
the named premises,
10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently purchased the
listed premises,
11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of income isfroma
part time waiter's job at the Salt Lake City restaurant, BACCI's [sic],
12. CI states that the suspect sells controlled substances to be able to
afford his own usage and as a separate source of income,
13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehiclefrequentlyused by the
suspect (female companion of suspect), and hours of operation for the suspect,
14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and usually during the
late evening hours,
The affiant was performing surveillance on the suspect at his home address
in West Valley on 6/14/00. During the initial surveillance your affiant did not
observe[] anyone at the residence, the surveillance was intermittentfrom2000
hours until 0600 6/15/00. During surveillance on 6/15/00 your affiant observed
some short term traffic which your affiant believes was drug related. Your affiant
had West Valley City Police Patrol perform a traffic stop on one of the vehicles
leaving the listed premises. During the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was
arrested for outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of marijuana,
approximately one half ounce. During the search of the vehicle a small section of
plastic bag was found, by affiant, and appears to have residue of cocaine inside
the twist section of the bag. Your affiant assisted in the search of the vehicle and
would like to inform the courts that no drag paraphernalia, used in the ingestion of
marijuana or cocaine, was located. Your affiant was told by the transporting
officers, of the arrested person, that no drug paraphernalia was found on the
subject, Oba Tramel.
Your affiant believes that the observations of the CI arefirsthand, accurate
and truth full [sic], for the following reasons. CFs observations are first hand and
from a person that has used marijuana and would recognized [sic] the substance
when observed. CI has not been promised nor [sic] paid for any of the
5

information provided. CI has provided the information out of a sense of guilt and
desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the community.
CFs observations were over a long period of time, even though the suspect has
only recently occupied the listed premises, within the last couple of months. CI
states that the illicit sales operation is ongoing and has been long term.
Your affiant observed vehicles described by CI at the named premises and
the registered owner was [as] described by CI. Your affiant has observed what
your affiant believes to be drug traffic, short term traffic coming and going to the
listed premises. Further one of the short visitors was stopped and found to be in
possession of marijuana and packaging material with residue of cocaine. Further
the arrested person was not found with any instruments used in the ingestion of
controlled substances, which your affiant believed shows that the marijuana was
purchasedfromthe listed premises.
Your affiant was told that the suspect is home infrequently and works at a
restaurant in Salt Lake City. Your affiant was told that the employment is part
time, your affiant checked on 6/15/00 and the suspect was not at work and it was
unknown when he was scheduled to return.
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for marijuana,
cocaine and associated packaging material and instruments used to ingest
controlled substances. Affiant has been told that all these items have been
observed inside the listed premises. Your affiant believes that the suspect should
be searched, affiant has been told that the suspect sells, uses and carries controlled
substances on his person.
Your affiant prays for any time, announced authority of service. Your
affiant has been told that the suspect is usually only at home during the late
evening hours and your affiant's observations have confirmed this.
Your affiant has reviewed the attached affidavit with Deputy Salt Lake
County District Attorney B. Kent Morgan and it has ben [sic] approved to be
presented to the courts for anytime and announced authority of service.
(R. 72-74.) Also, according to the record, the magistrate issued the warrant and
McCarthy executed it on June 15 "in the day time[]." (R. 76-78; 3).
At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court denied
the motion. Saddler maintains that the trial court erred in its ruling. The affidavit was
insufficient for issuance of a search warrant. The ruling on the motion to suppress must

6

be reversed, as further set forth below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
According to the law, an affidavit filed in support of a search warrant must
establish probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. To that end, the affidavit must establish the veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge of the person supplying information to the affiant; and it must contain detailed
facts of criminal conduct, and information to support an adequate police investigation.
In this matter, Detective McCarthy prepared an affidavit for a search warrant
based on information from an unidentified "confidential informant" or "CI." McCarthy's
affidavit failed to support probable cause.
Specifically, as set forth herein, the affidavit failed to support the veracity and
reliability of the informant. There is no indication on the record in this case that the
informant identified him- herself to McCarthy, met with McCarthy in person, or provided
any detailed information. The affidavit reflects only vague, broad allegationsfroma
member of the criminal sector, who refused to be involved or identified. In addition, the
allegations in the affidavit are general. The broadly-worded assertions fail to lend credence to the report or to the informant. Finally, McCarthy's independent investigation
failed to uncover criminal conduct involving Saddler or his residence. On that basis, the
affidavit must be deemed insufficient to support probable cause for the search warrant.

7

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING SADDLER'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
A. THE PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE AND RELIABLE INFORMATION.
The Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution requires that "probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation" be established prior to the issuance of a warrant. U.S.
Const. IV. "[W]hen a search warrant is issued on the basis of an affidavit, that affidavit
must contain specific facts sufficient to support a determination by a neutral magistrate
that probable cause exists." State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 987, 990-91 (Utah 1989) (quoting
State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188,190 (Utah 1986), cert, denied. 480 U.S. 930 (1987)). The
standard requires sufficient evidence to support "a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d
1303,1304 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983)).
A warrant issued without probable cause is unlawful.
Probable cause is determined under a "totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis.
State v. Singleton. 854 P.2d 1017,1019-20 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Gates. 462
U.S. at 238) (footnotes omitted);1 see also State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256,1259-62

1 In Gates. 462 U.S. 213, the United States Supreme Court "expressly abandoned
application" of a previously used, "Aguilar-Spinelli 'two-pronged test'" in favor of the
"totality-of-the-circumstances test." Singleton. 854 P.2d at 1019-20 (quoting Gates, 462
U.S. at 238). As this Court stated,
Prior to Gates, the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged analysis required that an affidavit
8

(Utah 1993); State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130-31 (Utah 1987); State v. Bailev. 675
P.2d 1203,1205 (Utah 1984); State v. Brown. 798 P.2d 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State
v. Purser. 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1304.
Under that analysis, Utah courts assess whether an affidavit contains detailed,
relevant facts concerning the informant and the alleged criminal conduct. Babbell 770
P.2d at 990-91; Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1304-05; Gates. 462 U.S. at 239. This Court has
stated the following with regard to the probable-cause standard:
Factors to consider in determining whether probable cause exists include an
informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233,
103 S.Ct. at 2329; State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987); State v.
Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990). In some cases, the circumstances
may require the supporting affidavit to set forth in detail the basis of knowledge,
veracity and reliability of a person supplying information in order to establish
probable cause. State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). In other cases,
if the circumstances as a whole demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's
report, a less strong showing is required. Id. at 1205-06. For example, reliability
and veracity are generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives
nothingfromthe police in exchange for the information. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at
1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 286; State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57-58 (Utah
App.1989), cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Courts have also

relying on information received from an informant provide the magistrate with (1)
the basis upon which the informant concludes that contraband is to be found at the
site to be searched and (2) the basis upon which the affiant believes the informant
is credible or that the informant's information is reliable. Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108,114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). See Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410,415-16, 89 S.Ct. 584, 588-89, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). In
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the United
States Supreme Court rejected the Aguilar-Spinelli approach and announced [the
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis].
Salt Lake Citv v.Truiillo. 854 P.2d 603, 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
9

consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the informant's
knowledge is based on personal observation. See Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130;
Brown, 798 P.2d at 287; Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57. Further buttressing
reliability is the detail with which an informant describes the facts set forth in the
affidavit and independent corroboration of the significant facts by police. See
Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102; Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 287.
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517; see also, Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1020,1021 (Utah courts have
used "the Aguilar-Spinelli factors as guides in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances
test. '[A]n informant's "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are but two relevant
considerations'"; court also considered the officer's surveillance and other investigative
techniques to find probable cause under the totality of the circumstances); Bailey, 675
P.2d at 1205 ("Depending on the circumstances, a showing of the basis of knowledge and
veracity or reliability of the person providing the information for the warrant may well be
necessary to establish with a 'fair probability that the evidence actually exists and can be
found where the informant says'"); Brown, 798 P.2d at 286; State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d
1099, 1102 (Utah 1985). In sum, the affidavit must contain sufficient information to
support the reliability of the informant, particular details regarding the matter, and
information to support an adequate police investigation.
In State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, the Utah Supreme Court found that the affidavit
for the search warrant supported probable cause where it established the informant's
veracity, reliability, and basis oj knowledge, as follows:
According to the affidavit [in Bailey], the informant had previously given
truthful information to the police concerning the existence of contraband, an
10

accepted method for establishing an informant's veracity. See McCray v. Illinois,
386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056,18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), where the United States
Supreme Court held there was a sufficient basis for probable cause of an arrest
because the informant had a history of giving reliable information to the police.
Furthermore, the reliability of the informant's statement was "boosted by
the detail with which the informant described his personal observation" of the
stolen property and the apartment. State v. Romero, Utah, 660 P.2d 715, 719
(1983). In addition, some weight should be accorded the fact that the informant,
an apparently disinterested person, came to the police and volunteered the
information. The informant gave his name, phone, address, and place of
employment. He stated that he was a concerned citizen who wanted to stop
burglaries and thefts. In State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160,499 P.2d 846, 848
(1972), we held that information from citizen informants who stand to gain
nothing from providing information to the police is not viewed with the same
rigid scrutiny as is the testimony of a regular police informant.
Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1206. There, veracity and reliability were relevant factors.
Next, in State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303, this Court emphasized the continuing
need for officers to include specific facts in an affidavit for a search warrant. With
respect to that factor, the Court stated the following:
"The fourth amendment requires that when a search warrant is issued on the basis
of an affidavit, that affidavit must contain specific facts sufficient to support a determination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause exists." The action of the
magistrate, however, must not be "a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of
others." Otherwise, the magistrate becomes only a "rubber stamp" for police,
abandoning the neutral and detached role which is "a more reliable safeguard
against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer."
Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1304 (citations omitted). There, this Court held that the affidavit
for the search warrant failed to establish probable cause where it contained conclusory
statements. LdL at 1305. Also, under a separate probable-cause determination, the Court
ruled that ,f[n]either the credibility of the informant nor the reliability of the information
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was ever established." IdL
Finally, in Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, the United States Supreme Court
emphasized the importance of independent police investigation and corroboration in the
probable-cause analysis. In that case, police officers received an anonymous letter
containing detailed information about defendants' drug trafficking. The letter specified
where Lance and Sue Gates lived and it identified how they made their drug buys. The
letter informed police that the Gateses would be involved in the next transaction in
Florida on May 3 and they would be transporting $100,000.00 in drugs in their car, from
Florida to Illinois. Also, the Gateses presently had over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in
their home and the home wasfrequentedby "big drug dealers." Gates. 462 U.S. at 225.
"[T]he anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained
facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties
ordinarily not easily predicted." Id, at 245.
In connection with receiving the letter, officers engaged in an independent
investigation. They confirmed Lance Gates' identification and address, they used a
confidential informant to secure additional personal information about the couple, and
they coordinated with police at the O'Hare airport regarding Lance Gates' flight plans
and arrangements. They worked with drug enforcement agents to keep surveillance on
theflight,and they maintained surveillance on the couple to confirm the basic facts in the
letter. Id. at 225-26. After officers had engaged in an independent investigation and
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confirmed information, they submitted to the magistrate an affidavit detailing their
investigations together with the anonymous letter. The magistrate issued a search
warrant. Id. at 226.
In reviewing the matter, the United States Supreme Court specified that "standing
alone, the anonymous letter sent to the Bloomingdale Police Department would not provide the basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe
contraband would be found in the Gates' car and home." Gates. 462 U.S. at 227. However, a review of the matter under the totality of the circumstances supported the standard.
The Court found that the detailed, anonymous tips, supplemented by the
independent police investigation established probable cause. "Our decisions applying the
totality of the circumstances analysis outlined above have consistently recognized the
value of corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work" Id. at
241 (emphasis added). The officers' investigation corroborated facts which could not be
generally known. Through their investigative efforts, the officers confirmed unique and
suspicious information and satisfied any deficiencies that existed in the letter.
In Saddler's case, the threshold issue is whether the affidavit, when read in a
common-sense manner under the total circumstances, established probable cause for
issuance of the warrant. In considering the matter, the trial court ruled as follows:
As set forth in today's memorandum, the magistrate does make a [common sense]
determination [that] probable cause exists[;] let's look at the totality of the circumstances. I have reviewed now the affidavit that supports the search warrant. I've
13

read both memorandums. In this particular case you have an experienced police
officer, Officer McCarthy. He indicates that he has 19 years of experience. He
indicates that there are a number of matters besides the affidavit. The most telling
certainly is that Paragraph 4, the CI identifies numerous times, the most recent
being within the last week that he had observed three to four pounds of marijuana.
I agree with Ms. Romero that many of the other allegations are rather broad
and vague and without Paragraph 4, (inaudible) issue, it would not support the
issuance of the search warrant but I'm thinking you have to look at the other
allegations which are very general in conjunction with Paragraph 4 which is very
specific. In this particular case, the confidential informant indicates that [] within
a week to ten days, he says there was three to four pounds of marijuana in the
defendant's residence. The detective does not simply take that at face value. He
does some corroboration of (inaudible) surveillance of suspect at his home address
in West Valley on June 14th. Surveillance on, it looks like June 15th. On June 15th
he observes short term traffic which (inaudible) believes were drug related. It goes
on to explain that. Based on all the circumstances with the totality of the situation,
I do believe that Judge Maughn was justified in issuing the search warrant;
therefore, I am denying the Motion to Suppress.
(R. 127:12-13.) The trial judge did not enter specific findings of fact on the issue.2 The

2 Findings apparently are unnecessary. In Deluna, this Court stated that since it is
bound on review "by the contents of the affidavit," it will not defer to the trial court's
findings, but rather, "we make an independent review of the trial court's determination of
the sufficiency of the written [affidavit] evidence." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, ^[9 (citing
Weaver. 817 P.2d at 833). That is appropriate since neither the magistrate nor the trial
judge here took evidence, observed witnesses, or made credibility determinations.
Indeed, in Saddler's case, this Court is assessing the evidence in its original form, as it
was presented to the magistrate judge on June 15, 2000, and the trial judge thereafter.
This Court also ruled that the "independent review" identified above does not
require a "de novo review of the magistrate's probable cause determination^]" Rather, it
requires only that this Court assess whether "a substantial basis" exists to support
probable cause. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, ^9 (citing BabbelL 770 P.2d at 991). "In
conducting this review, we will consider the search warrant affidavit in 'its entirety and in
a common sense fashion' and give 'great deference' to the magistrate's decision. The
affidavit must support the magistrate's decision that there is a 'fair probability' that
evidence of the crime will be found in the place or places named in the warrant." State v.
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah 1993).
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judge simply reviewed the information in the affidavit for the warrant and upheld it as
sufficient to support probable cause. The trial court's ruling was incorrect. The affidavit
was deficient, as further set forth below.
B. THE AFFIDAVIT HERE LACKED ANY INFORMATION TO SUPPORT
THE VERACITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANT. AND IT LACKED DETAILED INFORMATION. IN
ADDITION. THE DETECTIVE'S INVESTIGATION WAS INADEQUATE.
On appeal, this Court will assess the totality of the circumstances to determine if
McCarthy's affidavit was sufficient to support probable cause. To that end, this Court
will consider whether the affidavit established the "informant's veracity, reliability and
basis of knowledge." Purser, 828 P.2d at 517; see also Bailev. 675 P.2d at 1206
(assessing the "veracity" of the informant tofindprobable cause). This Court will assess
the "detail with which [the] informant describe[d] the facts set forth in the affidavit."
Purser. 828 P.2d at 517; Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1303-04 (emphasizing the need for
specific detail to support probable cause).
Also, this Court will consider whether the officer engaged in any relevant
independent investigation of pertinent facts. Purser. 828 P.2d at 517; Gates. 462 U.S. at
241 (emphasizing the importance of independent police investigation and corroboration);
see also Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 (considering the "type of informant"; "information
detail"; and "confirmation by police officer").
Based on a review of those factors under the totality of the circumstances, this
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Court should find that the affidavit failed to support probable cause, as set forth below.
The warrant was unlawful, and the search conducted in connection therewith violated the
Fourth Amendment.
1. The Informant Was a Member of the Criminal Sector.
(a) Veracity and Reliability.
Under the "veracity" and "reliability" analysis, this Court will consider whether the
informant's veracity may be "assumed," or whether the officer seeking the warrant was
required specifically to establish the veracity of the informant and the reliability of the
informant's report. See Purser. 828 P.2d at 517.
To begin, in some instances, if an informant is an ordinary, disinterested citizen,
who has no personal ties to or motives in reporting the alleged crime, Utah courts may
assume reliability and veracity. See Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1206 (an identified, disinterested
informant was considered reliable); Deluna. 2001 UT App 401, % 14; Kaysville v.
Mulcahv. 943 P.2d 231,235 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah
1997) (an identified, concerned and uninvolved citizen called in drunk driving tip to
police); St. George v. Carter. 945 P.2d 165,167,169 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied.
953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998) (Rick Hafen, an uninvolved citizen and restaurant employee,
called in a report of a person at the drive-up window with an open container; this Court
considered Hafen to be reliable because he gave his name and was disinterested). This
case does not present that situation.
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Here, Detective McCarthy prepared an affidavit for a search warrant based on information he obtained from a "confidential informant" or "CI." The affidavit reveals very
little about the CI. (See R. 72-74.)
Specifically, it states the following: McCarthy "received information" in an
undisclosed form from the CI; the CI used drugs on several occasions; the CI was familiar
with the use and possession of drugs; the CI allegedly observed Saddler use, sell, and
possess drugs; and the CI allegedly was familiar with Saddler's home and a vehicle he
used. According to the affidavit, the informant was not promised or paid any reward for
his/her information, and he/she disclosed information to McCarthy out of a sense of guilt.
(R. 72-73.)
The affidavit fails to support that the informant was an ordinary, disinterested
citizen. Here, the CI was a member of the criminal sector.
In State v. Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. 1999), the Tennessee Supreme Court
articulated the distinction between an ordinary "citizen informant" and an informant who
has ties to the criminal sector. In Stevens, an informant contacted police, and reported to
officers that defendant was involved in operating a clandestine methamphetamine
laboratory at a specific address. The informant described equipment used for the meth
operation and he described the cooking process. Based on the information, the officers
obtained a warrant and executed it against defendant's residence. IcLat 292.
In assessing the matter on appeal, the court refused to assume reliability/veracity
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since the informant was a member of the criminal sector. IdLat 294. The court stated that
information from an ordinary citizen is presumed to be reliable, and the affidavit need
not establish that the source is credible or that information is reliable, id.at 291, while
information from a member of the criminal sector, who may be seeking some concession,
is not entitled to the presumption. "The nature of these [latter] persons and the information which they supply convey a certain impression of unreliability, and it is proper to
demand that some evidence of their credibility and reliability be shown." Id. at 294.
Stevens supports that when an informant is involved in criminal conduct and gains
his knowledge through that involvement, he is not entitled to the presumption of reliability. The affidavit must contain specific information to support the credibility of the
informant in that instance. See State v. MickeL 765 P.2d 331,332-33 (Wash. App. 1989)
(informant was not deemed to be reliable where she had unexplained association with
crime); also Mulcahv, 943 P.2d at 235 n.2 (a person who gains information through involvement in criminal activity is lower on the reliability scale); Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1205.
Since McCarthy obtained information from a member of the criminal sector, he
was required to establish in the affidavit the veracity of the informant and the credibility
of the allegations. Veracity and reliability may be established in various ways. For
example, if the affidavit reflects that the informant gave her name and identifying
information to the detective, that may support veracity since the informant has "subjected
[herself] to a penalty for providing false information." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, ^[15.
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In this case, there is no indication that the CI gave his/her name or relevant
identifying information to McCarthy. Although McCarthy stated in the affidavit that he
did not want to publish the CFs name, McCarthy did not indicate whether he even had
that information. That is, McCarthy did not reveal whether the CI provided his/her
name. (See R. 70-74 (also, while McCarthy expressed his belief that the CI may be
harmed, there is no indication that the CI held such a belief).) Thus, there is no basis to
find that the CI was willing to risk "penalty for providing false information" here.
Deluna. 2001 UT App 401, Tfl5.
Also, if the affidavit reflects that the informant initiated contact and met with the
officers to report the alleged criminal conduct, that may lend support to veracity and
reliability. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; State v. Treadwav. 499 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah
1972); State v. Harris. 671 P.2d 175,177 (Utah 1983) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Search
& Seizure. § 3.3 (1978)): see also Purser. 828 P.2d at 517-18; Brown. 798 P.2d at 286;
Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 55.
In Bailey. Treadwav. Harris. Purser. Brown, and Stromberg. the officers included
information in the affidavit to support the veracity of the informant, where the informant
had specifically identified himself to the officer, and/or the informant was personally
available to the officer. See Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1206 (informant, who had previously
given truthful information to police, approached police, volunteered information, and
gave his name, phone, address and place of employment to officer); Treadwav. 499 P.2d
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at 848 (the informant, Poulsen, had no personal interest in whether defendant was arrested
or not); Harris, 671 P.2d at 177 (the informant, Knight, met with officers and pointed out
criminal conduct occurring in defendant's backyard); Purser. 828 P.2d at 518 (the confidential informant met with officers and assisted them in controlled drug buys); Brown.
798 P.2d at 286 (citizen initiated contact with officers and volunteered information);
Stromberg. 783 P.2d at 55 (informant met with officers and disclosed personal
observations relating to defendant's drug use). Also, if the affidavit reflects that the
informant has a history of reliability with the officer and/or the officer was able to
confirm the informant's past reputation as reliable, the informant's credibility may be
established. See Bailev. 675 P.2d at 1206; McCrav v. Illinois. 386 U.S. 300 (1967)
(informant's reliability established with record of past performance).
Those facts do not exist in this case. The affidavit here fails to indicate how
McCarthy came into contact with the informant. It fails to disclose whether the CI
initiated contact with McCarthy, whether the CI identified him- herself to McCarthy,
whether McCarthy and the CI spoke in person, or whether the informant left a note for
McCarthy with or without a signature and/or return address. The affidavit also fails to
disclose whether McCarthy had prior dealings with the CI or whether he conducted any
research into the CI's history.
Finally, courts consider whether the informant was merely a witness to the
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criminal activity, since that may support veracity and reliability. See Deluna, 2001 UT
App 401417 (citing Mulcahv. 943 P.2d at 235 n.2). In Deluna. this Court considered an
informant to be reliable where she had been present during methamphetamine production
and simply observed the process. The Court ruled that under the facts, "Niece #2" was
merely a witness, thereby lending credibility to her report. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,
f 17; see also State v. Blaha. 851 P.2d 1205,1207-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (informant
drove with husband, who went inside apartment to buy drugs; informant was not present
during crime, and informant identified herself to McCarthy); State v. White, 851 P.2d
1195 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (same).
The informant in Saddler's case was not a mere witness to criminal conduct. The
affidavit reveals that the unnamed CI used drugs. (See R. 72, % 3 (CI used drugs with
suspect)); Treadwav. 499 P.2d at 848 (recognizing that "unnamed police informers"
frequently are criminals and require proof of credibility or reliability).
Also, while Detective McCarthy stated in the affidavit that the CI was not promised or paid any reward for the information (R. 73 ("CI has not been promised [or] paid
for any of the information")), there is no indication as to whether the informant was able
to avoid prosecution for his/her alleged criminal conduct either in exchange for the
information to McCarthy or by making an anonymous report. Indeed, the circumstances
leave an impression that the informant escaped prosecution, where he/she retained
anonymity and/or cooperated to curry favor with the police and prosecution.
21

In short, the affidavit here lacks pertinent information about the CI. This Court has
refused to find probable cause where the affidavit lacked detail about the informant. In
Droneburg. the sheriff prepared an affidavit for a search warrant based on the following:
Garfield County Sheriff Robert Judd received information from a confidential
informant on April 24,1987, that methamphetamine, a controlled substance, was
to be delivered to a residence in Panguitch, Utah. On April 28, the informant
further advised the Sheriff that the individual delivering the methamphetamine had
departed California and was to arrive in Panguitch between 2:00 and 4:00 p.m.
Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1303. The sheriff represented in the affidavit that "his request for
a warrant was based on '[information from [a] reliable informant... that a supply of
illegal substances is coming in.' The Sheriff believed the information to be reliable
because he had 'used this confidential informant before and [had] found them [sic] to be
reliable.'" Id, at 1303. Thereafter, a warrant was issued for the residence and all vehicles.
At approximately 3:00 p.m., a pickup truck with California license plates pulled
into the driveway of the residence. The officer questioned an occupant of the truck and
became satisfied that the occupant's route and arrival corroborated the information from
the informant. The officer executed the warrant against the truck and discovered drug
paraphernalia, marijuana, and traces of methamphetamine. Id. at 1304.
On appeal, the state conceded that the warrant was unlawful. Nevertheless, the
state claimed the search was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement that
required proof of probable cause. This Court rejected the state's claim as follows:
Sheriff Judd obtained information from a confidential informant that a delivery of
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controlled substances was expected. Neither the credibility of the informant nor
the reliability of the information was ever established. The record reveals nothing
to indicate how, when, or where the information was obtained. Sheriff Judd
stated that he had used the informant previously and found "them" to be reliable,
but there is no indication as to how many times this occurred, when it last
occurred, the circumstances, or even whether one or more informants were
involved. Although the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of
confidential informants are no longer strict prerequisites for establishing probable
cause, they are still "relevant considerations, among others, in determining the
existence of probable cause under fa totality-of-the-circumstances.f " State v.
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127,130 (Utah 1987) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34, 103
S.Ct. at 2329-30, 76 L.Ed.2d 527). Otherwise, a court cannot determine whether
the information was obtained in the context of unreliable circumstances such as
casual rumor. See, e.g., Spinelliv. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S.Ct. 584,
589,21L.Ed.2d637(1969).
Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1305-06 (emphasis added).
The affidavit in Saddler's case contains no information to support the CI's
veracity, or the reliability of his/her information to the detective. The record reveals
nothing about how, when or where McCarthy obtained the information from the CI; how
the detective came into contact with the CI; whether the CI met with the detective in
person or contacted him surreptitiously; whether the CI identified him- herself to the
detective; whether the detective had any prior or related dealings with the CI; whether the
detective did any investigation into the veracity of the CI; whether the CI had a history of
providing false/true reports of criminal conduct; whether the CI had a criminal record of
his/her own; whether the CI could be found and held accountable if his/her report in this
case proved to be false; or whether the CI was arrested/prosecuted as a result of the
admissions he/she made concerning his/her involvement in the criminal conduct.
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In the end, the informant in this case is as mysterious as an anonymous letter. See
Gates, 462 U.S. at 227 (the United States Supreme Court considered the detailed
information in an anonymous letter to be insufficient to support the reliability of the
informant(s) or to support probable cause).3 The lack of information about the CI conveys
a certain impression of unreliability that is not resolved on this affidavit.
M

[N]either the credibility of the informant nor the reliability of the information was

ever established." Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1306; id. at 1303 (the officer, who prepared
the affidavit, knew the confidential informant and considered him to be reliable because
he had "used this confidential informant before"; that was insufficient.) "The record
reveals nothing to indicate how, when, or where the information was obtained." Id. at
1306. That is insufficient to support probable cause.
(b) Basis ofKnowledge.
In this case, "basis of knowledge" arguably was established in part where some of
the information outlined in the affidavit "camefromthe [] informant's] personal obser-

3 The term "anonymous" means "1 with no name known or acknowledged 2 given,
written, etc. by a person whose name is withheld or unknown 3 not easily distinguished
from others or from one another because of lack of individual features or character."
Webster's New World College Dictionary, 58 (4th ed. 1999). That definition fits the
circumstances surrounding the CI in this case. There is no name acknowledged, no
information to support that the CI's name was known, and no information concerning the
CI's individual features or character.
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vations." Dehma, 2001 UT App 401,1fl3.4
Even if "basis of knowledge" may be established, that factor alone is insufficient to
give credibility to the CI or to the CI's report. In this case, the magistrate had no basis
for finding the informant trustworthy. (See supra subpoint B.l .(a).) There was no reason
for the magistrate to believe that items of criminal conduct could be found in places
identified by the CI since veracity and reliability were lacking.
In State v. Novembrino. 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987), the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated the following:
[T]he unidentified informant's conclusory allegations that "Otto usually keeps the
drugs in the gas station" and that he "witnessed Otto dealing drugs" are
unsupported by any specific facts from which a neutral judge could independently
derive a reasonable suspicion that a search would yield evidence of criminal
activity. The fact that a police officer may be willing to believe the tip of an
informant-particularly one who has been helpful on prior occasions—does not
lessen the judge's duty to scrutinize the substance of the tip in order to weigh its
sufficiency against the practical standard of probable cause. As Justice Jacobs
observed in State v. Macri, [39 NJ. 250, 188 A.2d 389 (1963),] "Before the judge
4 The affidavit alleges that the CI made certain observations. (See R. 73-74, ^flj 2, 5, 6,
9.) Those observations may support "basis of knowledge" under Dehma, 2001 UT App
401, %l3. Also, where the "suspect" made incriminating statements to the CI, that may be
sufficient to support "basis of knowledge." See Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (2002).
The affidavit also contains allegations that lack any information relevant to basis
of knowledge. Paragraphs 11 and 12 assert that "the suspect's only legitimate source of
income is from a part time waiter's job" at a downtown restaurant, and "the suspect sells
controlled substances to be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of income." (R. 73.) While McCarthy attributes those statements to the CI, there is no
indication in the affidavit as to how the CI learned the information. The CI did not claim
that he/she had personal knowledge of the facts or that he/she obtained the information
from any relevant source. Consequently, paragraphs 11 and 12 must be disregarded as
speculative and insupportable.
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is in a position to make his determination for issuance, he must properly be made
aware of the underlying facts or circumstances which would warrant a prudent
man in believing that the law was being violated.n 39 N.J. at 257, 188 A 2d 389.
Here, the informant's tip is a bald conclusion, allegedly based on personal
observation, but unsupported by any reference to dates, events, or circumstances.
Id at 838 (emphasis added).
In this case, the CPs allegations of "first-hand" knowledge are bald conclusions,
as set forth below. (See infra subpoint B.2.) Where the circumstances in this case fail to
support veracity, and the allegations lack detail (see supra, subpoint B.l.(a), and infra
subpoint B.2.), the "basis of knowledge" factor likewise must fail, and cannot sustain
probable cause.
2. The Affidavit Lacked Sufficient Detail to Support Probable Cause.
This Court will consider whether the affidavit contained sufficient detail about the
alleged criminal conduct to support a warrant. See Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1303; Dehma,
2001 UTApp 401,1fl9.
In Droneburg. as stated above, a sheriff prepared an affidavit for a warrant based
on an informant's initial and subsequent report that methamphetamine was to be delivered
to a particular residence in Panguitch, Utah. The sheriff had worked with the informant
in the past and considered him to be reliable. The informant advised the sheriff that the
individual delivering the methamphetamine to the residence "had departed California and
was to arrive in Panguitch between 2:00 and 4:00 p.m." Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1303.
The sheriff obtained a warrant for the residence and vehicles based on that information
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and ultimately executed the warrant and arrested the defendant.
On appeal, this Court ruled that the allegations of criminal conduct lacked
sufficient detail to support probable cause. The affidavit was based on conclusions. Id. at
1304 (ruling that the action of the magistrate "must not be 4a mere ratification of the bare
conclusions of others5"); Babbell. 770 P.2d at 990.
In this case, sufficient details are lacking to support probable cause. The affidavit
fails to contain any information about the CI or his/her encounter with McCarthy (see
supra, subpoint B.I.). In addition, the claims of criminal conduct are non-specific, "bare
conclusions." The allegations of criminal conduct set forth in the affidavit are as follows:
1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year,
2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on numerous occasions
during the last year,
3. CI has used marijuana with the suspect on several occasions,
4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent being within the
last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana,
5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the suspect uses to weigh out
repackaged marijuana for resale,
6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with packaging material,
7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on his person,
8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells marijuana and cocaine,
9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled substances, inside the
named premises,
10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently purchased the listed
premises,
11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of income is from a part
time waiter's job at the Salt Lake City restaurant, BACCFs [sic],
12. CI states that the suspect sells controlled substances to be able to afford his
own usage and as a separate source of income,
13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehiclefrequentlyused by the
suspect (female companion of suspect), and hours of operation for the suspect,
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14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and usually during the late
evening hours[.]
(R. 72-73.) Some of the numbered paragraphs are variations on the same theme. (See
e.g., R. 72-73,ffl[2,3,9 (alleging use of controlled substances).)
In essence, the numbered paragraphs allege the following: the CI knew the suspect
for more than a year (R. 72, ^1); the suspect used drugs on unspecified occasions and at
his home (R. 72-73, f|f2, 7, 9); the CI used drugs (R. 72, ^3); the CI observed the suspect
in possession of packaging material and drugs (R. 72,ffl|4, 5, 6); the suspect sold drugs
from the home on some unspecified occasion(s) (R. 72, <[fl[5, 6, 8); the suspect recently
purchased the home, worked at a downtown restaurant and drove a vehicle (R. 73, THJ10,
11, 13); and the suspect was home infrequently, he kept "hours of operation," and he
"usually" was home late in the evening. (R. 73, ffl[13,14.)
The allegations of criminal conduct in this case are conclusory. Also, they are
written in the past tense without any reference to time. Specifically, paragraphs 2, 3, 5,6,
7, 8, and 9 discuss general drug/paraphernalia use and possession at unspecified times
that may span "over 1 year" (R. 72, ^fl), and they allege conduct under unspecified
circumstances. The allegations raise questions as to what was observed, when it was
observed, what the drugs looked like (crystal, rock, or powder form; plant, or dried
leaves), who was present, how events appeared or transpired, what was said, and what
the informant's involvement was. There is no detail or description of unique and
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distinctive events to lend credence to the vague allegations.5
Next, Paragraphs 10 and 13 contain general, innocuous allegations that cannot be
confirmed or connected to any criminal conduct due to the lack of detail. For example,
according to paragraph 10, Saddler told the CI that he recently purchased the home
identified in the affidavit. That does not support criminal conduct. (See supra note 4,
herein.) In addition, the allegation is hearsay.
According to paragraph 13, the CI provided "a description of the home," and the
vehicle used by Saddler. (R. 73, ^13.) Although the affidavit contains an address for the
residence (R. 70), the affidavit fails to disclose whether the CI provided any relevant
description of the house or car. See Babbell. 770 P.2d at 991, 992 (finding detail sufficient where affidavit "set out specifically and in detail the characteristics of the truck as
described by the witnesses, including the make, approximate year, four-wheel-drive
equipment, color, missing bumpers, cracked windshield, orange seat covers, and '55 mph
sucks' button on the driver's visor"). If the CI had identified a unique characteristic of
the residence or vehicle, that information might lend credibility to the report. As it
stands, the allegations constitute general observations. They add nothing to the analysis.
The CI also allegedly disclosed the "hours of operation for the suspect," and that
"the suspect is home infrequently and usually during the late evening hours." (R. 73, ffl]
13,14.) The affidavit fails to specify the "hours of operation," thus, again lacking detail.
5 With respect to the assertions at paragraphs 11 and 12, see supra, note 4, herein.
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In the end, the only allegation of criminal conduct that the trial judge considered
relevant to support probable cause was contained in paragraph 4. (See R. 127:12-13.) It
stated that CI had been to the premises "numerous times, the most recent being within the
last week to ten days, and [he/she] observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana." (R.
72, ^[4.) Assuming, arguendo, the allegation may be read to support that the CI had
observed 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana within the last week to ten days at the residence, it
is insufficient.6
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that "an officer's statement
that 'affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and believe that
heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate."' Gates. 462 U.S. at 239.
As in Nathanson, this is a mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate
virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable cause.
Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to
determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare

6 Paragraph 4 also is vague. In its literal sense, it supports that the CI had visited the
premises on numerous occasions, and he/she observed approximately three to four pounds
of marijuana. The phrase, "the most recent being within the last week to ten days,"
interrupts the actual message. Also, that phrase only serves to identify the most recent
visit to the premises by the CI. It does not relate to the amount of marijuana observed
during any visit in particular. Thus, in its literal sense, paragraph 4 should be read to
support that the CI had visited the premises a number of times, with the most recent visit
to have occurred within the last week to ten days. Also, over the course of his/her
numerous visits, he/she observed approximately three to four pounds of marijuana.
In the end, paragraph 4 fails to provide any particular or meaningful information.
For example, did the CI observe marijuana and/or packaging material at the premises a
week to ten days before his/her report to McCarthy, and if so, did the CI describe the
observations in any detail? Since the search warrant ultimately hinged on paragraph 4,
the magistrate should have demanded more.
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conclusions of others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review
the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued.
Id. An informant's report gains credence only through specific and detailed facts.
Here, the affidavit taken as a whole fails to contain any detailed information. In
sum, there are no pertinent facts about the CI to support veracity, and no details about
his/her observations to support credibility. The affidavit fails to indicate how or where
the CI observed the alleged marijuana in the home, what it looked like, or how it was
packaged. The affidavit raises more questions than answers: who is the CI; what is
his/her affiliation with Detective McCarthy; what did he/she observe beyond the general
and unspecified use, possession and distribution of drugs and paraphernalia; when did
he/she make his/her observations; when did he/she contact McCarthy; how did he/she
contact McCarthy; what did he/she disclose to McCarthy in detail; where did he/she
contact McCarthy; and what happened to the CI after his/her admitted criminal activity?
Probable cause requires a degree of selectivity. General statements that the
suspect lives in a home, drives a vehicle, and had marijuana in the home some time in the
past few days does not provide adequate assurance to support the probability that
evidence of crime will be found on the premises. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. Any
person shielded by anonymity could report such generalities, thereby rendering the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement an exercise without accountability. If the
informant is a drug user, as here, the general assertions about drug possession and use,
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without necessary detail, should raise questions and suspicions.
The lack of detail here failed to support probable cause.
3. The Officer's "Corroboration" Was Inadequate.
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court ruled that an anonymous letter was
insufficient to support probable cause. The letter identified who the suspects were; where
they lived; that "over $100,000.00 in drugs" could be found in their home in the basement; that most of their drug buys took place in Florida; that the suspects made their
living selling drugs; and that the suspects bragged about their drug transactions. It
contained particular details as to how the suspects obtained drugs; particular details about
the next planned drug buy; and a general description of the type of person who purchased
drugsfromthe suspects. Also, the letter was written in the present tense. Gates, 462 U.S.
at 225. "[T]he anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just to easily
obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third
parties ordinarily not easily predicted." Id at 245.
Notwithstanding the details, the Supreme Court ruled that standing alone, the
anonymous letter to the police "would not provide the basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the Gates'
car and home." Id, at 227. The Court ultimately upheld the warrant due to extensive
police investigation. In doing so, it emphasized "the value of corroboration of details of
an informant's tip by independent police work." Id. at 241.
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Next, in Deluna, this Court stated that an officer "'may corroborate [a] tip either
by observing the illegal activity or by finding [the material facts] substantially as
described by the informant."9 Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, ^[20 (citing Mulcahv. 943 P.2d
at 236). Also, '"[w]here the reliability of the information is increased, less corroboration
is necessary."' Deluna. 2001 UT App 401, Tf21 (Mulcahv. 943 P.2d at 236).
In this case, as set forth above, the affidavit failed to support the reliability of the
informant to any degree. (See supra, subpoint B. 1.) It also lacked adequate police
investigation and corroboration.
For example, while the CI reported information that may have been generally
known or easy to verify (i.e., Saddler lived at the residence, he recently purchased the
residence, and he used a vehicle), the lack of detail prevented the magistrate from
assessing whether the CFs report was credible (see supra, subpoint B.2.), and it prevented
the magistratefromassessing whether the detective was able to corroborate even innocent
"[material facts] substantially as described by the informant." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,
1J20. That is, even if the detective was able to confirm facts concerning the residence and
vehicles, the investigation would not bolster the credibility of the report since the report
was vague in thefirstplace. "[T]he informant did not supply a 'wealth of collateral
detail.'" MickeL 765 P.2d at 333 (cite omitted). Thus, the magistrate judge was not able
to scrutinize the detective's investigative efforts under the probable-cause standard.
Next, with respect to the allegations of criminal conduct, the CI reported drug
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trafficking, the suspect's "hours of operation," and that the suspect was home
"infrequently and usually during the late evening hours." (R. 73, ^[13,14.)
Assuming, arguendo, the "hours of operation" were the "late evening hours"
when the suspect "usually" was home (R. 73,1fl[l3,14), McCarthy was unable to confirm
any "operation" during "late evening hours." According to the affidavit, "[d]uring the
initial surveillance your affiant did not observe[] anyone at the residence, the surveillance
was intermittent from 2000 hours until 0600 6/15/00." (R. 73.)
After McCarthy engaged in the "initial surveillance" and observed nothing, he then
engaged in a "surveillance on 06/15/00." According to the affidavit, McCarthy observed
the following:
During surveillance on 6/15/00 your affiant observed some short term traffic
which your affiant believes was drug related. Your affiant had West Valley City
Police Patrol perform a traffic stop on one of the vehicles leaving the listed
premises. During the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was arrested for
outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of marijuana,
approximately one half ounce. During the search of the vehicle a small section of
plastic bag was found, by affiant, and appears to have residue of cocaine inside the
twist section of the bag. Your affiant assisted in the search of the vehicle and
would like to inform the courts that no drug paraphernalia, used in the ingestion of
marijuana or cocaine, was located. Your affiant was told by the transporting
officers, of the arrested person, that no drug paraphernalia was found on the
subject, Oba Tramel.
(R. 73.) McCarthy also summarized his investigation as follows:
Your affiant has observed what your affiant believes to be drug traffic, short term
traffic coming and going to the listed premises. Further one of the short visitors
[Tramel] was stopped and found to be in possession of marijuana and packaging
material with residue of cocaine. Further the arrested person was not found with
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any instruments used in the ingestion of controlled substances, which your affiant
believed shows that the marijuana was purchased from the listed premises.
(R. 73-74.)7 Thereafter, on June 15, McCarthy prepared the affidavit for a search warrant
and presented it to the magistrate. (R. 70-75.) The magistrate issued the warrant that day
and specified that it was to be executed "in the day time." (R. 76-78.) McCarthy then
executed the warrant on June 15. (R. 3.)
The total circumstances relating to the June 15 surveillance raise several questions,
and they constitute inadequate corroboration for the following reasons:
First, while the affidavit specifies the hours of the "initial surveillance" (R. 73
(intermittent from 2000 hours until 0600 6/15/00)), it does not specify the hours of the
subsequent "surveillance on 6/15/00." (R. 73.) The affidavit suggests the "surveillance
on 6/15/00" occurred during the day. (See R. 73 (describing "initial surveillance,"
followed by "surveillance on 6/15/00"); 76-78 (warrant issued and executed on June 15
during the day ).) Where the suspect allegedly kept "hours of operation" during "the late

7 McCarthy also reported that he observed "vehicles" at the premises and the
"registered owner was [as] described by the CI." (R. 73.) That allegation apparently
relates to the CI's report of the car used by Saddler. (See R. 73, ^13.) Since the officer
was keeping surveillance on a home allegedly belonging to Saddler, his observation of the
car used by Saddler fails to support criminal conduct. It is a vague and general
observation that adds nothing to the analysis.
Also, McCarthy reported that he was told "the suspect is usually only at home
during the late evening hours and your affiant's observations have confirmed this." (R.
74.) That assertion is unclear. During the "initial surveillance," which involved the late
evening hours, McCarthy "did not observe anyone at the residence." (R. 73.) McCarthy
failed to indicate in the affidavit when or how he observed "the suspect" at the residence.
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evening," it is unclear what McCarthy hoped to observe during the day to support
criminal conduct. The affidavit was unclear. It required more detail.
Second, the affidavit failed to contain any specific detail regarding the June 15
surveillance. McCarthy simply stated that during the surveillance, he "observed some
short term traffic which your affiant believes was drug related." (R. 73.) The allegation
was vague, ambiguous, and generally stated. For example, the report lacked information
as to what McCarthy meant by "short term traffic" (e.g. 2 people or more visiting the
residence), how long a "short term" visit lasted (e.g. 1 minute, 3-5 minutes or 30
minutes), or what he observed to support his beliefs (e.g. did McCarthy observe the
visitor engage in any furtive gesture once he/she was outside the house, or did he/she
leave with a suspicious package or bulging pockets?). The investigation was inadequate.
Third, McCarthy failed to set forth any detail regarding "Oba Tramel." According
to McCarthy, Tramel was seen "leaving the listed premises" on June 15, and he was
subsequently stopped for outstanding warrants and arrested. (R. 73-74.) In connection
with the arrest, officers "later found" approximately one half ounce of marijuana to be in
Tramel's "possession." In addition, McCarthy claimed that he located a plastic bag in the
car and it "appear[ed] to have residue of cocaine inside the twist section of the bag." (R.
73.) Although McCarthy did not specifically assert that Tramel obtained drugs from
Saddler, he speculated with respect to such in the affidavit. (R. 74 ("affiant believe[s]...
that the marijuana was purchasedfromthe listed premises").)
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McCarthy's investigation fails to support any relevant connection between Tramel,
the residence, and/or drugs allegedly sold there. For example, there is no indication that
McCarthy observed Tramel arrive at the home, that Tramel made contact with anyone at
the home, that Tramel acted in a suspicious manner or made any furtive gestures when he
left the home, that McCarthy made any effort to contact the CI to make a connection
between Tramel and drugs at Saddler's home, that the drugs or packaging found in
Tramp's possession resembled the quality of drugs or the kind of packaging described by
the CI, and/or that McCarthy attempted to talk to Tramel about the drugs. (See R. 72-74.)
McCarthy simply speculated about the matter. That is insufficient. See State v. Johnson.
805 P.2d 761,764 (Utah 1991) (paucity of facts failed to support inference under
reasonable-suspicion standard); Mulcahy. 943 P.2d at 234 {reasonable suspicion is a
lower standard than probable cause).
Also, where the officers who stopped Tramel "later found11 him "to be in possession of marijuana" (R. 73), there is no information in the affidavit as to when the
officers found the substance either in conjunction with Tramel leaving the residence or
the traffic stop. Likewise, there is no information as to where the officers found the
substance (e.g. whether the officers found the substance "on the subject, Oba Tramel" (R.
73), wedged in the back seat, placed in the back of the glove compartment, or lodged in
the spare tire compartment in the trunk), or whether the officers observed Tramel make
any furtive or suspicious moves inside or around the car when he left the residence to
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support that he may have placed the controlled substance in a particular place in
connection with his visit.
In short, without the necessary details, it is impossible to know how the controlled
substance later found in Tramel's "possession" (R. 73) may be connected to the
residence.8
Also, while McCarthy claims he observed "cocaine residue" on a small section of
plastic bag, there are no details about that observation (i.e. when or where the plastic bag
was found and how it appeared). In addition, there is no indication that while the bag was
in McCarthy's control, he attempted to perform any kind of field test on it to confirm his
suspicions. (See R. 72 (McCarthy alleged to have training in drug investigation
techniques).) Indeed, where McCarthy could provide specific details in the affidavit,
either as the details related to the June 15 surveillance or the search of Tramel and his car,
McCarthy chose to rely on vague assertions and speculation.9
8 McCarthy also reported that officers did notfindTramel to be in possession of any
drug paraphernalia. That assertion is irrelevant, particularly since the affidavit failed to
reveal where the drugs were located in the car. For example, if officers found the drugs
wedged in Tramel's back seat or stashed in the trunk, and officers did not observe Tramel
reach into the back or go into the trunk after he left Saddler's house, those facts would
suggest that the drugs were in the car before Tramel reached the residence, Tramel did not
place the drugs in the car, Tramel did not know they were there, and/or he did not own the
drugs. If Tramel did not own the drugs, it is likely that he also did not own paraphernalia.
9 The affidavit also contained a paragraph concerning McCarthy's experience as a
narcotics officer (R. 72), and a summary of McCarthy's investigative efforts. (R. 73-74.)
The paragraph concerning McCarthy's experience does not specify how long he has
worked in drug enforcement. (See R. 72.)
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Finally, the criminal activity alleged in this case is the type of activity that lends
itself to police surveillance and corroboration. As set forth in Gates. 462 U.S. at 241-43
(identifying importance of corroboration, and extensive investigation that occurred in the
case), independent corroboration is valuable to the analysis. Where an informant alleges
drug trafficking, officers may investigate the claims and make observations consistent
with drug trafficking patterns. See U.S. v. Warren. 42 F.3d 647, 652-53 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(officers established probable cause where they corroborated "a reliable informant's tip
about drug activity at a residence by conducting a single controlled buy of illegal
narcotics"; also, informant's proven track record supported reliability); U.S. v. Cook. 949
F.2d 289,292 (10th Cir. 1991) (officer observed residence for 7 days, noted activity at
night and coordinated controlled purchase); U.S. v. Scott. 91 F.3d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir.
1996) (based on specific reportsfromtwo informants, officers observed a number of brief
exchanges consistent with informants' description of crack cocaine sales); Purser. 828
P.2d at 518 (officers corroborated reports through use of informant in two controlled
purchases). Such patterns were not described in this case in any meaningful way.
Indeed, the corroboration in this case was insufficient and lacked relevant detail.
See Rushing v. State. 500 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (first-time informer's
report of defendant in possession of marijuana with a certain companion in a two-tone
green Ford pickup truck and officer's confirmation that defendant was with companion in
the truck held insufficient to support probable cause for warrantless arrest/search); U.S. v.
39

Leake. 998 F.2d 1359, 1365 (6th Cir. 1993) (unidentified informant's report that he observed 300 pounds of marijuana in defendant's home, "was not 'rich' in relevant detail11;
also, officer's corroboration of house and vehicle registrations was insufficient); U.S. v.
Gibson. 928 F.2d 250, 252-53 (8th Cir. 1991) (unknown informant's detailed description
of home and drugs observed there, and officer corroboration of several innocent details
including a description of the house and defendant's car deemed insufficient).
The detective failed to provide relevant facts or details of unusual civilian or
vehicular traffic at the address to support drug trafficking, and he failed to make any
relevant connection between Tramel and the "listed premises." (R. 73.)
In addition, the affidavit in this case failed to establish the reliability of the
unknown CI and it failed to specify whether that informant disclosed any details to
McCarthy. Where the affidavit failed to establish the reliability of the informant, more
corroboration was needed. See Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, ^[21.
Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, the affidavit here failed to
support probable cause. Saddler respectfully urges this Court to declare the warrant
unlawful, to find the search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and to reverse the trial
court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
C. THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT SAVE THE WARRANT.
According to the law, if an officer uses an unlawful warrant to conduct a search,
the evidence obtained during execution of that warrant must be suppressed under the
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exclusionary rule at trial. See State v. FixeL 744 P.2d 1366,1368-69 (Utah 1987)
(recognizing that suppression is required if a search is rendered unconstitutional under
traditional Fourth Amendment standards). The suppression of evidence is an appropriate
remedy, where a police officer's search is unlawful and violates a fundamental right.
The United States Supreme Court has articulated a "good faith" exception to the
suppression remedy of the exclusionary rule. Under the "good faith" exception, if an
officer relies in good faith on a search warrant that is later deemed to be unlawful, the
evidence obtained in connection with the warrant need not be suppressed. See United
State v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897,922 (1984). The reasonableness of the "good faith" reliance
is viewed objectively. Id.
Under the Fourth Amendment, objective "good faith" reliance on a warrant does
not exist where (1) the affiant knew or should have known that the information was false;
(2) the magistrate abandoned his role and failed to act neutrally; (3) the affidavit was so
lacking in indicia of reliability that reliance thereon was unreasonable; or (4) the warrant
was "so facially deficient - i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the
things to be seized - that executing officers [could ]not reasonably presume it to be
valid." Leon. 468 U.S. at 923; see also State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah Ct. App.
1993), cert denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
In this case, Leon's "good faith" exception does not apply because the affidavit
was so lacking in indicia of reliability that it was not reasonable for McCarthy to rely on
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the search warrant.
As set forth above, the affidavit here failed to support the reliability of the
informant, and it failed to provide adequate detail with respect to the informant's
allegations of criminal conduct. The affidavit contained vague, conclusory assertions.
That was insufficient. In addition, McCarthy's independent investigation was irrelevant
and inadequate.
"When the magistrate reviewing the affidavit in support of the search warrant is
not presented with sufficient facts to determine probable cause, the warrant cannot be
relied upon by searching officers." State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(citing Leon. 468 U.S. at 920-23), reversed on other grounds. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992);
see Horton, 848 P.2d at 712; Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1305.
"Good faith" logically cannot exist if there are material omissions relating to the
search warrant affidavit, the officer involved in the matter failed to engage in an adequate
investigation regarding the allegations, and the officer who prepared/presented the
affidavit was also involved in executing the warrant to effectuate the search.
The "good faith" exception does not apply here. McCarthy could not rely in "good
faith" on the warrant. McCarthy both prepared and presented the affidavit to the
magistrate for the search warrant. The affidavit contained material omissions (see supra,
subpoint B.l. and 2.), and reflected an inadequate police investigation (see supra,
subpoint B.3.). Given McCarthy's experience and the insufficiencies here, the state is not
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able to claim application of the "good faith" exception to this case.
In this case, suppression is required where a trained officer should have known that
the warrant was deficient despite the magistrate's authorization. See U.S. v. Hove. 848
F.2d 137,139-140 (9th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Baker. 894 F.2d 1144, 1149-50 (10th Cir.
1990). This Court should reverse the trial judge's ruling on the motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Saddler respectfully requests that this Court
reverse and remand the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
SUBMITTED this/V*day of
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, 2002.

<^1 Tf/CQsj^
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Third District Court, State of Utah
Salt Lake City, West Valley Department
3636 S. Constitution Blvd., WVC, UT 84119
SENTENCE / JUDGMENT FORM
Plaintiff.

CITY / STATE
-VS-

Defendant
DOB:

IJ—I-

CASE NUMBER.
DATE
]
JUDGE /}/) rlH1(&n;r/}
/ T5T
CLERK_
Plaintiff Counsel.
Defense Counsel.
Interpreter:

AMENDED:

CHARGES:

THE COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS:
(l)FINEAMT $
FINE AMT $~
FINE AMT $]
FINE AMT $"
FINE AMT $"
FINE AMT $"

SUSP
SUSP
SUSP
SUSP
SUSP
SUSP

JAIL
JAIL"
JAIL"
JAIL"
JAIL"
JAIL"

(2) RESTITUTION $
.Pay to:_
Court
(3) COURT COSTS $
(4) ATTORNEY FEES $.
TOTAL DUE $ _ _ _ _ _
Payment Schedule: Pay $
mo
1st Pmt
(5) Community Service in lieu of Jail / Fine. .Hrs
.Court
(6) Probation / TUA
Mos. V
(7) TERMS OF PROBATION / TUA
•
No Further Violations
•
AA Meetings
/wk.
./month
•
Random UA's
•
No Alcohol/non prescribed Cont Subs
•
Antabuse
Proof Of
OTHER

•
•
•
•
•

SUSP_
SUSP_
SUSP_
"SUSP_
SUSP_
"SUSP
Victim

Due.
AP&P.

Show Proof to Court

Last Pmt Due.
.Date Due
ACEC

Counseling thru.
Classes
In/Out Treatment.
Health Testing
Employment

APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN
30 DAYS OF JUDGMENT
X.

District Court Judge

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-WV DEPT. COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OP UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case NO: 011101571 FS

ANTHONY ALEXANDER SADDLER,
Defendant.
Custody: Bail

Judge:
Date:

TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
January 29, 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
christih
Prosecutor: MCCULLAGH, BRENDAN P
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROMERO, SHANNON
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 26, 1973
Audio
Tape Number:
02040
Tape Count: 1154
CHARGES
1. POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition.- 09/25/2001 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/INTENT TO DIST
CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced
to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 011101571
Date;
Jan 29, 2002
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Pine:
Suspended;
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$5000.00
$4000.00
$459.46
$1000.00
$5000,00
$4000.00
$459.46
$1000.00
Plus Interest

SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
Def to pay fine through APfcP at the rate of $100 a month
COMMUNITY SERVICE
Complete 100 hour(s) of community service.
SENTENCE COMMUNITY SERVICE NOTE
Def to complete at the rate of at least 10 hours a month

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 24 month(s) .
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1000.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
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Case No: 011101571
Date:
Jan 29, 2002
PROBATION CONDITIONS
No other violations.
Comply with Adult Probation and Parole.
Not to possess/consume alcohol or non prescribed controlled
substance.

Notify probation agent of any prescribed medication.
Random drug t e s t i n g .
Not to associate with persons or frequent places where drugs or
alcohol are being used or are the chief item of sale.
Submit to search of self or property by probation agent.
Maintain fulltime verifiable employment/education.
Receive drug and alcohol evaluation and comply with
recommendations.
Provide written v e r i f i c a t i o n of completion of community service.
Defendant may apply costs of treatment to fine with r e c e i p t s .
Dated t h i s - g ^ day of

OCWN.

Page 3 (last)
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ADDENDUM B

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

ADDENDUM C

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss

C o u n t y of S a l t Lake

)

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:

JUDGE

ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has reason to believe
That

(X) on the persons of Saddler, Anthony A,, 1/26/73,
(X) on the premises known as 4300 West 3194 South, a
single family dwelling, on the west side of the road, the front
door faces to the east, the numbers 3194 South appear on the front
of the home mail box in front of the home, to include all
containers, locked and unlocked, rooms, attics, basements,
outbuildings attached and unattached found within the curtilage.
( ) in the vehicles described as N/A
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or
evidence described as:
SEE ATTACHMENT "A"
and that said property or evidence:
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense/ or
(X) is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense; or
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crime (s) of Possession of Marijuana and Possession
of Cocaine With Intent To Distribute.

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE,
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
SHORT STRAWS, GLASS PIPES FOR SMOKING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES,
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS.
6. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN ROCK OR POWDER FORM, A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
7. MARIJUANA, A GREEN LEAFY MATERIAL, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,

PAGE TWO
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The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search
Warrant are:
Your affiant, Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022 , is employed
by the West Valley City Police Department, and is currently
assigned to the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit. Your affiant has been
given the responsibility to investigate narcotic offenses occurring
in West Valley City and surrounding areas.
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification
and in the investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has
personally purchased various narcotics on numerous occasions in
relation to police investigations. Affiant was previously assigned
to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force and the Drug Enforcement Strike
Force. Your affiant is a certified peace officer in the State of
Utah for over 19 years. Your affiant's specialized training
includes the DEA basic and advanced investigators seminars, as well
as the California Narcotics Officers Association seminars in drug
recognition, identification and investigative techniques. Your
affiant is also certified in the investigation of Clandestine
Methamphetamine Laboratories. Your affiant is a certified Bomb
Technician.
Your affiant is investigating Anthony A. Saddler for usage and
distribution of controlled substances, specifically marijuana and
cocaine. Your affiant received information from a confidential
informant, hereinafter referred to as CI. Your affiant ask the
courts not to require your affiant to publish the CI's name. Your
affiant believes that the CI may be harmed if CI's name were
published. Your affiant was told the following by the CI:
1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year,
2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on
numerous occasions during the last year,
3. CI has used marijuana with the suspect on several
occasions,
4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent
being within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to
4 pounds of marijuana,
5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the
suspect uses to weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale,
6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with
packaging material,
7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on
his person,
8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells
marijuana and cocaine,
9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled
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substances, inside the named premises,
10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently
purchased the listed premises,
11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of
income is from a part time waiter's job at a Salt Lake City
restaurant, BACCI's,
12. CI states that the suspect sells controlled substances to
be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of income,
13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle
frequently used by the suspect (female companion of suspect), and
hours of operation for the suspect,
14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and
usually during the late evening hours,
Your affiant was performing surveillance on the suspect at his
home address in West Valley on 6/14/00.
During the initial
surveillance your affiant did not observed anyone at the residence,
the surveillance was intermittent from 2000 hours until 0600
6/15/00. During surveillance on 6/15/00 your affiant observed some
short term traffic which your affiant believes was drug related.
Your affiant had West Valley City Police Patrol perform a traffic
stop on one of the vehicles leaving the listed premises. During
the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was arrested for
outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of
marijuana, approximately one half ounce. During the search of the
vehicle a small section of plastic bag was found, by affiant, and
appears to have residue of cocaine inside the twist section of the
bag. Your affiant assisted in the search of the vehicle and would
like to inform the courts that no drug paraphernalia, used in the
ingestion of marijuana or cocaine, was located.
Your affiant was
told by the transporting officers, of the arrested person, that no
drug paraphernalia was found on the subject, Oba Tramel.
Your affiant believes that the observations of the CI are
first hand, accurate and truth full, for the following reasons.
CI's observations are first hand and from a person that has used
marijuana and would recognized the substance when observed. CI has
not been promised nor paid for any of the information provided. CI
has provided the information out of a sense of guilt and desire to
stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the
community. CI's observations were over a long period of time, even
though the suspect has only recently occupied the listed premises,
within the last couple of months. CI states that the illicit sales
operation is ongoing and has been long term.
Your affiant observed vehicles described by CI at the named
premises and the registered owner was a described by CI. Your
affiant has observed what your affiant believes to be drug traffic,
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short term traffic coming and going to the listed premises.
Further one of the short visitors was stopped and found to be in
possession of marijuana and packaging material with residue of
cocaine. Further the arrested person was not found with any
instruments used in the ingestion of controlled substances, which
your affiant believed shows that the marijuana was purchased from
the listed premises.
Your affiant was told that the suspect is home infrequently
and works at a restaurant in Salt Lake City. Your affiant was
told that the employment is part time, your affiant checked on
6/15/00 and the suspect was not at work and it was unknown when he
was scheduled to return.
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for
marijuana, cocaine and associated packaging material and
instruments used to ingest controlled substances. Affiant has been
told that all these items have been observed inside the listed
premises.
Your affiant believes that the suspect should be
searched, affiant has been told that the suspect sells, uses and
carries controlled substances on his person.
Your affiant prays for any time , announced authority of
service. Your affiant has been told that the suspect is usually
only at home during the late evening hours and your affiant's
observations have confirmed this.
Your affiant has reviewed the attached affidavit with Deputy
Salt Lake County District Attorney B. Kent Morgan and it has ben
approved to be presented to the courts for anytime and announced
authority of service.
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WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for
the seizure of said items:
( ) in the day time,
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or
altered, or for other good reasons to wit:
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the
officer's authority or purpose because:
( ) physical harm may result to any person if notice
were given; or
( ) the property sought may be quickly destroyed,
disposed of, or secreted.
N/A

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this / <5

day of
Time

JUDC
IN THE fTH^KD DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND EOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

fl^2°°°'

ADDENDUM D

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
NO
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the state of Utah.
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Det.
Bill McCarthy, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That

(X) on the persons of Saddler, Anthony A., 1/26/73,
(X) on the premises known as 4300 West 3194 South, a single family
dwelling, on the west side of the road, the front door faces to the east, the
numbers 3194 South appear on the front of the home mail box in front of the
home, to include all containers, locked and unlocked, rooms, attics,
basements, outbuildings attached and unattached found within the curtilage.
( ) in the vehicles described as N/A
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
bhere is now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence
described as:
SEE ATTACHMENT "A"
tfhich property or evidence:
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed or
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense or
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of
committing or concealing a public offense or
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct,
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
ou are therefore commanded:

*r

in the day time^
at any time of the day or night (good cause having been shown)
to execute without notice of authority or purpose,
(proof under oath being shown that the object of this
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or
that harm may result to any person if notice were given.)

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE,
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
SHORT STRAWS, GLASS PIPES FOR SMOKING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES,
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS.
6. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN ROCK OR POWDER FORM, A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
7. MARIJUANA, A GREEN LEAFY MATERIAL, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,
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t o make a s e a r c h of t h e a b o v e - n a m e d o r d e s c r i b e d p e r s o n ( s ) , v e h i c l e ( s ) , and
p r e m i s e s f o r t h e h e r e i n - a b o v e d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y o r e v i d e n c e and i f you f i n d
t h e same o r any p a r t t h e r e o f t o b r i n g i t f o r t h w i t h b e f o r e me a t t h e T h i r d
D i s t r i c t C o u r t , County of S a l t L a k e , S t a t e o f U t a h , o r r e t a i n s u c h p r o p e r t y
in your c u s t o d y , s u b j e c t t o t h e o r d e r o f t h i s c o u r t .

3IVEN UNDER MY HAND and d a t e d

this

/s

day of %

2000.

ADDENDUM E

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

: Case No. 011101571 FS

Plaintiff,
! v
ANTHONY A. SADDLER,
Defendant.

i SEPTEMBER 11,2001

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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I

think that's sufficient.

1
2

THE COURT:

3 1

MR. MCCULLAGH:

4

MS. ROMERO:

5

THE COURT:

All right.

Both sides submit it,

Submit

Yes, Your Honor.
All right. As set forth in today's

memorandum, the magistrate does make a comment since

6

7 ' determination of probable cause exists and let's look at the
8

totality of the circumstances.

I have reviewed now the

9

affidavit that supports the search warrant.

10

memorandums.

11

police officer, Officer McCarthy.

I've read both

In this particular case you have an experienced

12 ' years of experience.

He indicates that he has 19

He indicates that there are a number of

13 J matters besides the affidavit.

The most telling certainly is

14 j that Paragraph 4, the CI identifies numerous times, the most
15 ; recent being within the last week that he had observed three to
four pounds of marijuana.

16

I agree with Ms. Romero that many of the other

17

18 j allegations are rather broad and vague and without Paragraph 4,
19

(inaudible) issue, it would not support the issuance of the

20 j search warrant but I'm thinking you have to look at the other
21 | allegations with are very general in conjunction with Paragraph
22

4 which is very specific.

In this particular case, the

!

23 i confidential informant indicates that that within a week to ten
i
i

24 i days, he says there was three to four pounds of marijuana in
25

the defendant's residence.

The detective does not simply take
12

that at face value. He does some corroboration of (inaudible)
surveillance of suspect at his home address in West Valley on
June 14 th . Surveillance on, it looks like June 15th. On June 15th
he observes short term traffic which (inaudible) believes were
drug related.

It goes on to explain that.

Based on all the

circumstances with the totality of the situation, I do believe
that Judge Maughn was justified in issuing the search warrant;
therefore, I am denying the Motion to Suppress.
MR. MCCULLAGH:
THE COURT:
MS. ROMERO:

Set it for pretrial?
Yeah.

MR. MCCULLAGH:
THE COURT:
at 8:30.

Your Honor, pretrial?

Yes.

Okay.

We'll set pretrial on September 25

Is that a good day for both counsel?
MR. MCCULLAGH:
MS. ROMERO:
THE COURT:

It is, Your Honor.

It is, Your Honor.
Do you want me to set a trial date at

this time or wait until pretrial?
MR. MCCULLAGH:
MS. ROMERO:
THE COURT:

Why don't we wait until the pretrial?

Yeah.
All right.

Court is in recess.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

(C)

13

